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Abstract: The conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand for new economic instruments
which have a focus on environmental protection in the macro and micro economy. An important economic
tool being part of the treaty of Kyoto in that area is Joint-Implementation. It is an international program
which intends to strenghten international cooperations between enterprises in order to reduce CO
2
-emissions.
A sustainable development can only be guaranteed if the instrument is embedded into an optimal energy
management. For that reason, the Technology-Emissions-Means (TEM) model was developed, giving the
possibility to simulate such an extraordinary market situation. In this paper, the Kyoto Game is introduced
and a rst approach to Joint International Emissions Trading (JET) is given.
1 Introduction
The realization of Joint-Implementation (JI) is determined by technical and nancial constraints. In a
JI Program, the reduced emissions resulting from technical cooperations are recorded at the Clearing
House. The TEM model integrates both the simulation of the technical and nancial parameters. In
Pickl (1999) the TEM model is treated as a time-discrete control problem. Furthermore, the analysis
of the feasible set is examined in Pickl (2000). In the following, a short introduction into the TEM
model is given. Furthermore, we want to present a new bargaining approach which leads towards a
procedure for an international emissions trading procedure within the so-called Kyoto game.
2 The Technology-Emissions-Means (TEM) model
The presented TEM model describes the economic interaction between several actors (players) which
intend to maximize their reduction of emissions (E
i
) caused by technologies (T
i
), by expenditures of
money (M
i
) or by nancial means. The index stands for the i-th player, i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. The players
are linked by technical cooperations and the market.
The eectivity measure parameter em
ij
describes the eect on the emissions of the i-th player if the
j-th actor invests money for his technologies. We can say that it expresses how eective technology
cooperations are (like an innovation factor), which is the central element of a JI Program. The
variable ' can be regarded as a memory parameter of the nancial investigations, whereas the value

i
acts as a growth parameter. For a deeper insight see Pickl (1999). The TEM model is represented
by the following two equations:
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It is a great advantage of the TEM model, that we are able to determine the em
ij
-parameter empir-
ically. In the rst equation, the level of the reduced emissions at the t+ 1-th time-step depends on
the last value plus a market eect. This eect is represented by the additive terms which might be
negative or positive.
In general, E
i
> 0 implies that the actors have yet reached the demanded value E
i
= 0 (normalized
Kyoto-level). A value E
i
< 0 expresses that the emissions are less than the requirements of the treaty.
In the second equation we see that for such a situation the nancial means will increase, whereas
E
i
> 0 leads to a reduction of M
i
(t+ 1):
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The second equation contains the logistic functional dependence and the memory parameter '
i
which describes the eect of the preceeding investment of nancial means. The dynamics does not
guarantee, that the parameter M
i
(t) lies in the interval, which can be regarded as a budget for the
i-th actor. For that reason we have to add the following restrictions to the dynamical representation:
0 M
i
(t) M

i
; i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 0; : : : ; N:
These restrictions ensure that the nancial investigations can neither be negative nor exceed the
budget of each actor. Now, it is easy to show that
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(t)]  0 for i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 0; : : : ; N:
We have guaranteed that M
i
(t + 1) increases if E
i
(t) + '
i
E
i
(t)  0 and it decreases if E
i
(t) +
'
i
E
i
(t)  0. Applying the memory parameter '
i
, we have developed a reasonable model for the
money expenditure - emission - interaction, where the inuence of the technologies is integrated in
the em-matrix of the system.
We can use the TEM model as a time-discrete model where we start with a special parameter set
and observe the resulting trajectories. Normally, the actors start with a negative value, i.e., they
lie under the baseline mentioned in Kyoto Protocol, see Kyoto (1997). They try to reach a positive
value of E
i
. By adding control parameters, we enforce this development by an additive nancial
term. For that reason the control parameters are added only to the second equation of our model:
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The introduction of the control parameter u
i
(t) implies that each actor makes an additional inves-
tigation at each time-step. In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state,
mentioned in the treaty of Kyoto, by choosing the control parameters such that the emissions of each
player become minimized. The focus is the realization of the necessary optimal control parameters
via a played cost game, which is determined by the way of actors cooperation.
3 The Cost-Game in the TEM Model
Let us regard the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the TEM-model
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we can also formulate
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In order to reach steady states, which are determined in Pickl (1999), an independent institution
may inuence the trade relations between the actors. The trade relations are expressed by the em-
matrix. In practice, the imposing of taxes or the giving of incentives means that in the TEM-model
the em-parameter will change.
Now, the principle of JI implies that technical cooperation will be benetted. If there is a cooperation
between player 1 and player 2, we introduce an additional parameter ;  > 0, which implies that the
measure of eectivity increases. The cooperation of the great coalition is expressed by the parameter
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This extension of the TEM model results in a cost-saving eect at each time-step, which can be
expressed by an cooperative cost-game. According to ( 1) and ( 2) let us begin with the construction
of the cost-game in the TEM-model
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In the sequel, we have
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For the time-dependent grand coalition we get:
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(t)  0 (i; j 2 f1; : : : ; ng) the dierence between the cooperative and the non-cooper-
ative case is always positive. So we have constructed a reasonable cost-game. Now, the method is
that at each time step, this amount is put into a central fund, which can also be used as a feasible
set for our control process. In the following we analyse a special allocation principle.
4 The Allocation of the fund and the Kyoto Game
In order to get an intuition of the problem, let us begin with a very simple case where we have only
two players. The fund exists and the two players have two alternatives to invest. The coordinate
axis is the starting point of the two players. Each actor tries to reach the black square which stands
for the level of reductions of emissions mentioned in Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto (1997). For that reason
we have a limited time-horizon.
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Figure 1: Multi-step investments
After the rst time-step one of the squares with a grey square will be attained. The players make
their choice independently and simultaneously. The directions are attached by the small diagram.
The rst player goes to the right. If he reduces one unit of CO
2
-emissions, then he has to invest 3
nancial units. If he will attain a reduction of two units he has to invest 5 nancial units.
One of the main problems in the area of JI and JET is the question of an optimal schedule of
technical innovations. Therefore, in Krabs, Pickl (2000) the control problem is solved from a pure
mathematical point of view.
Here, we model such a situation with a time-discrete approach where we have three investment
units. Each actor can choose between two alternatives (2-step-1-step or 1-step-2-step). The strategy
2-step-1-step stands for a great reduction at the beginning and a smaller investment at the end of the
period. The costs are lower than a 1-step-2-step strategy because we want to simulate innovations.
We can transfer this simple model with two players and two time-steps to an easy matrix game,
which we call the Kyoto-Game.
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Figure 2: Kyoto Game
The pairs (7; 7) and (8; 8) are Nash-equilibria. A derivation from that chosen strategy is not favourized
by one player acting alone. Nevertheless the tuple ((1; 2); (1; 2)) is favourized by every actor yielding
a minimum of nancial costs.
5 The Co-funding Process and Joint International
Emissions Trading - JET
If we want to support a special path or technology, then we can introduce an additive tax to a special
energy path. It is possible to regard  as a Pigou tax.
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Figure 3: Pigou taxation
It is easy to see that for  > 1 only one Nash-Equilibrium exists. The value  = 1 can be seen
as maximal trading interval, or as a necessary technical eectivity measure to guarantee uniqueness.
Furthermore, as the necessary data is given to the Clearing House, we are able to compare the
obtained results with real world phenomena. An extension to an n-player situation with various
time-steps may lead to new insights in that economic eld and support an improvement of such
important energy management tools.
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